Brigham Young University

BYU ScholarsArchive
Theses and Dissertations
2022-12-14

A Usability Study of FIDO2 Hardware Tokens on Mobile Devices
Stephen Lambert
Brigham Young University

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/etd
Part of the Physical Sciences and Mathematics Commons

BYU ScholarsArchive Citation
Lambert, Stephen, "A Usability Study of FIDO2 Hardware Tokens on Mobile Devices" (2022). Theses and
Dissertations. 9781.
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/etd/9781

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by BYU ScholarsArchive. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of BYU ScholarsArchive. For more information, please
contact ellen_amatangelo@byu.edu.

A Usability Study of FIDO2 Hardware Tokens on Mobile Devices

Stephen Lambert

A thesis submitted to the faculty of
Brigham Young University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Science

Daniel Zappala, Chair
Casey Deccio
Kent Seamons

Department of Computer Science
Brigham Young University

Copyright © 2022 Stephen Lambert
All Rights Reserved

ABSTRACT
A Usability Study of FIDO2 Hardware Tokens on Mobile Devices
Stephen Lambert
Department of Computer Science, BYU
Master of Science
Passwords as the primary form of authentication on the web have many issues, such
as password re-use across sites and difficulty in remembering secure passwords. The FIDO
Alliance has created a passwordless system that has with support from companies like Google,
Apple, and Microsoft: FIDO2. Studies have shown so far that users find FIDO2 usable on
personal computers, but no work has been published on its usability on mobile devices. I
conducted a lab study in which participants used FIDO2 passwordless authentication with
hardware tokens on a mobile phone. Participants found FIDO2 usable on mobile devices, but
had similar fears as participants in prior studies, primarily revolving around account loss. I
also found that showing participants an instructional video after they had used FIDO2 on
a mobile device increased perceived usefulness and likelihood of adoption, though usability
scores remained about the same.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

Passwords are the ubiquitous authentication method on the web. However, even when
passwords are handled properly, password requirements and human behaviors can lead to
account compromise. This generally arises due to the limited useful capacity of the human
mind: people can forget passwords. In order for a password to be very secure, it needs to be
long and random, which makes it hard to remember [17]. Because long, random passwords
are hard to remember, many people use passwords that are easy to remember, but these can
be comparatively easily compromised by an attacker [8]. With this in mind, many services
require passwords to have a variety of characters such as numbers and symbols. Unfortunately,
this often doesn’t actually solve the problem [9], as people often use their weak passwords
with added required characters (e.g. “Password1!”). People also tend to reuse passwords
across sites so they don’t need to memorize as many. While using a single strong password
everywhere may seem wise at first, if one service mishandles that password or the password
is otherwise compromised, whoever has access to the compromised password has access to all
of the user’s services.
One solution to this problem is Two-factor Authentication (2FA). Accounts using 2FA
require a registered second factor be present in addition to the password to authenticate.
This second factor can range from possession of a particular phone (as with Duo Mobile) to
a dedicated hardware token that stores cryptographic keys. General security advice suggests
using 2FA for all of one’s sensitive or important accounts, such as those used for banking and
email; and many organizations require 2FA for employees.
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The next step in authentication security after augmenting password-based security
with 2FA is replacing passwords altogether with passwordless authentication (often referred
to as 1FA). This allows the user to not worry about passwords at all, relying solely on their
non-memory-based authentication factor. 1FA has had a recent resurgence in popularity with
the FIDO2 (Fast IDentity Online) standards allowing users to register to websites using a
hardware token alone rather than a password. With FIDO2, many users’ accounts will be
much more secure than with their weak passwords.
However, not many studies have been performed to test the usability of 1FA, and
those studies that have been done have had some important limitations, leaving large holes
in what we understand about 1FA. The main hole I sought to fill with this research is that of
1FA in the mobile context. Nearly all 1FA research has focused on 1FA in the desktop/laptop
context, but many users also need to authenticate to services on their mobile devices.
I conducted a study that took 20 participants through 3 simulated days of an individual
who would have FIDO2 available on their web accounts on their mobile device, including
interactions with a mock payment website, a mock video streaming website, and a mock
employee website. After the simulation, participants were administered a survey on their
experience with SUS (System Usability Scale) and TAM (Technology Acceptance Model)
questions, as well as qualitative questions about the experience with FIDO2 and their
perceptions of the system. After taking the survey, participants were shown a video informing
them how and why the system is used, and they were given a nearly-identical survey.
The study found that users considered FIDO2 with hardware tokens on mobile devices
to be usable, and users seem to be generally accepting and would be willing to adopt it if it
was widespread. Users reported FIDO2 to be convenient to use, with some added security,
but many users are concerned with potential account loss. It also found that educating users
on FIDO2 after having them try it did not increase perceived usability, but did increase
perceived usefulness of FIDO2, which may contribute to the increase in likelihood of adoption.
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Chapter 2
Related Work

Many solutions have been proposed to solve the issues that come with password-based
authentication. Bonneau et al. analyzed many of these proposed solutions to determine if
any of them would be viable to replace current password authentication [2]. What they found
was that, while many options had advantages over passwords in the realms of security and
usability, none had a strict advantage over passwords in every aspect. Each authentication
system has its own set of trade-offs, and different use cases could benefit from different
systems. As a result, it has been difficult to migrate users away from passwords.

2.1

Password Managers

One of these solutions is password managers. As the name implies, these manage a user’s
passwords: they serve as a place to store all of their passwords (often encrypted); often sync
between devices; and usually have some sort of password generation tool, so users don’t need
to think up a long random password.
While password managers can provide great benefits, not everyone uses them, or
uses them correctly. Zhang et al. performed an interview study of users of different types
of password managers and individuals who did not use password managers regarding their
password management practices [18]. They found many things that motivate users to use
password managers, or to not use them, as well as how these users use (or don’t use) the
features of their password manager. Participants who didn’t use password managers were
often concerned with security or with their personal “mastery” of their passwords. Those
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concerned with password “mastery” felt that they needed to personally memorize all of their
passwords: giving up that control and becoming dependent on some software to remember
their passwords was not an option. Some participants wondered about the ability of the
developers of the password manager to read their passwords, showing a misunderstanding
of the technology in general; Karole et. al also found some users uncomfortable with online
password managers due to the possibility of an attack on the servers storing the passwords
[10].
But even for users of password managers, those that used managers built into their
browser were more concerned with convenience than security, so they would often still re-use
weak passwords everywhere, and the password manager would just allow them to not have to
type it out each time they authenticated. Users of separately-installed password managers
were generally better about not re-using the same password everywhere, but some of them
still would, usually because the passwords were already in place before they started using the
password manager and they hadn’t gotten around to changing those passwords. Unfortunately,
some users had difficulty using their particular password manager, and they would just revert
to writing passwords down on paper.
Seiler-Hwang et. al conducted a usability study of password managers on smartphones
[15]. They found that many mobile password managers had issues when it comes to integrating
with browsers and other applications, drastically reducing usability from a browser-extension
password manager on a desktop.
Alkaldi and Renaud conducted a study of user adoption of smartphone password
managers [1]. Among similar results to previous studies, such as the desire of some users to
“master” their passwords, they found that many password managers aren’t “enjoyable” to use.
Even if users don’t find difficulty using a password manager (i.e. it’s usable), they may not
use it because it doesn’t give them the good feelings that other apps do.

4

2.2

Two-factor Authentication

With password managers out in the wild and people still not using them to their full potential,
the next step to harden account security has been to require a second authentication factor
(Two-factor authentication, or 2FA). Colnago et al. studied the deployment of a required
2FA system at a university (Duo Mobile), and found positive and negative reception [4].
Some people were frustrated that they were required to have their own phone while no phone
was issued by the university. Others had difficulty granting access to their account for other
parties, such as their parents. Some others, however, liked the system so much that they
decided to adopt 2FA on some of their other online accounts, leaving the usability of 2FA
open to further discussion.
Krol et al. conducted a study with interviews on UK bank customers regarding their
experience with 2FA and found generally negative results [11]. Many customers suffered
unnecessary headache associated with authentication for the websites for these banks, which
the paper says could be relatively easy to alleviate. Some users interviewed actually switched
banks to avoid using their previous bank’s 2FA system, which is not a testament to usability.
Das et al. analyzed specifically the usability of hardware tokens for FIDO U2F (Fast
IDentity Online Universal 2nd-factor standard) and found that users often didn’t understand
the benefits of using 2FA and had difficulty setting it up and using it on their accounts [5].
However, once participants understood how 2FA strengthens security over passwords alone
and they received better instructions, users generally didn’t struggle very much, and many
adopted 2FA on their accounts long-term. Similarly, Reese et al. found that, though some
participants in their study of 2FA usability were unable to log in quickly because their second
factor was not nearby, participants generally found 2FA very usable when implemented well
and well explained [14].
One pain point that is often forgotten in the area of 2FA (and 1FA) is account recovery
in the event that an authenticator is lost or stolen. Still and Tiller, as well as Kunke et al.
both analyzed account recovery options when dealing with authenticator loss [12, 16]. Both
5

papers found that the best option is for users to have a backup authenticator registered,
though most users don’t. Some use their phone as a backup, but some use their phone as
their authenticator, making its use as a backup pointless. Some suggest knowledge-based
recovery may be the answer, but that would basically nullify the point of trying to secure
accounts without just using passwords.

2.3

Passwordless Authentication

1FA, in the form of FIDO2, is one of the newest proposed solutions to the password authentication problem. Farke et al. studied the attempted adoption of FIDO2 by employees at
a company [7]. However, employees were allowed to choose their authentication method,
and most of them just reverted to using their passwords again, as it is familiar to users and
many don’t want to change. Even many of the employees who used password managers, who
acknowledged that FIDO2 was more secure, opted to continue using their password manager
due to how fast authentication can be with a password manager.
Lyastani et al. performed a lab study to gain users’ perspectives on the usability
of FIDO2 passwordless authentication and its viability in replacing passwords altogether
[13]. They found that, while many users fear losing their authenticator (thus access to their
account), many are willing to accept passwordless authentication and hope FIDO2 will be a
good password replacement.
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Chapter 3
User Study Design

I conducted a user study that focused on the usability of FIDO2 hardware tokens in
the mobile context. While the previously-mentioned studies cover FIDO2 hardware tokens
in the context of desktop computers, no research had previously been published on using
FIDO2 hardware tokens for authentication using a mobile device as a client to a web service.
This study was a lab study in which participants were given the opportunity to use a
FIDO2 hardware token to log into 3 sites using a smartphone: a mock payment website, a
mock video streaming website, and a mock employee website. These websites were chosen to
cover multiple authentication general use-cases: personally sensitive accounts (payment site),
work-sensitive accounts (employee website), and leisure accounts (streaming website). The
payment site and the employee site represent sites that already often require authentication
each time a user visits the site, while the streaming site represents sites that keep the
user logged in with cookies. This was important so users had the experience of frequent
authentication for sensitive accounts. Participants were recruited from the BYU student
body using flyers around campus.
This study assumes that all students have had experience using passwords on a mobile
device, as passwords are still the most common form of authentication. With that assumption,
participants did not use password-based authentication in this study. All participants used
FIDO2 hardware tokens for all three accounts, so they could get a feel for the token usage itself,
rather than basing their thoughts on interaction with a single website. After experiencing
authentication on each site with the phone, participants were given a survey to measure the
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usability, acceptance, and any other comments or concerns of FIDO2 authentication with a
hardware token on a mobile device.
Participants used an NFC-enabled smartphone and a YubiKey 5 NFC provided by
our lab (Usable Security and Privacy Lab) to complete the tasks for the study.
The study was carried out in the following order:
 Welcome message: the study began with a message to give instructions to the

participants.
 Scenario introduction: participants were introduced to the scenario for them to

simulate in the study. Participants were informed about a passwordless system that
their accounts would use involving the use of a hardware token.
 Hands on tasks: participants were given a sheet with a list of tasks involving registering

with, logging into, and using three different mock websites, with tasks grouped into
three days to simulate. At the end of each simulated day, the participant was brought
out of the room and back in to simulate the passage of time to the next day. The list
of tasks can be found in Appendix A.
 Combined Survey:

– SUS (System Usability Scale): the 10-question survey on usability initially created
by Brooke et al. [3]. The questions are listed in Appendix B.
– Acceptance: acceptance by participants was measured using the Technology
Acceptance Model (TAM) [6]. The questions/statements are listed in Appendix C.
– Qualitative questions: qualitative questions were asked each participant to
obtain data not collected with the quantitative questions.
– Video: participants were shown a video about the purpose and security benefits
and drawbacks of FIDO2 hardware authentication. The script for the video is in
Appendix D.
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– Repetition of Survey: participants were given the SUS, TAM, and qualitative
portions again to see if any differences arise after viewing the video.
– Demographics: participants were asked basic demographic questions including
questions on their education and field of work.
The script for the video describes the basic usage of FIDO2 hardware tokens, then
asks and answers questions that a prospective user would likely have about FIDO2. These
questions included topics such as phishing, hardware token loss, and account sharing. The
objective of the video was to help participants understand the benefits and general usage
of FIDO2 with hardware tokens. We included a short section on how account recovery and
account sharing works, because these are concerns that have been expressed by participants
in prior studies.
This study was approved by the Institutional Review Board of Brigham Young
University before it was conducted.
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Chapter 4
Study Results

The user study ran from June 22nd, 2022 through July 28th, 2022. A total of 20
participants participated in the study. Participants took between 33 minutes and 58 minutes
and received 15USD in compensation.

4.1

Demographics

All participants were students at Brigham Young University from age 18 to 29. 11 participants
were male and 9 were female. 4 had college degrees and the rest had high school as their
highest completed education. 2 participants stated they had previous computer science
experience. Areas of study of the participants had lots of variety.

4.2

SUS

We used the System Usabilty Scale (SUS) to measure user perceptions of the usability of
FIDO2 with hardware tokens on mobile devices. SUS uses a series of 10 questions with a
5-point Likert scale (strongly disagree to strongly agree). Questions are valued from 0 to 10
and summed for a total SUS score of up to 100. 68 is considered an average SUS score, and
80.3 or higher is considered to be within the top 10 percent.
We had participants take the SUS survey both before watching the instructional video
and after. (Both were after performing the tasks involving the use of FIDO2.) The results
are shown in Figure 4.1.
The average before the video was 80.0: definitely a good score, but not quite in the
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Figure 4.1: SUS responses of the 20 participants, before and after the video
top 10 percent. The minimum was 50.0, the maximum was 97.5, and the standard deviation
was 10.93. The average after the video was 79.25, with a minimum of 52.5, a maximum of
97.5 again, and a standard deviation of 10.43.
SUS scores by participant are shown in Figure 4.2.
I ran a one-tailed one-sample t-test on the differences of individuals’ SUS scores
to determine if the drop in SUS score was statistically significant, as scores from some
participants changed dozens of points after the video, and calculated a p-value of 0.39: the
0.75 point drop in the SUS score was well within the bounds of random variation.
A recent study of FIDO2 hardware tokens [13] found a SUS score of 71.92 for passwords,
and a SUS score of 81.74 for FIDO2 with hardware tokens. While the SUS scores we found
for FIDO2 with hardware tokens on mobile devices was very close around 80, more consistent
methods would need to be applied in order to make direct comparisons to their study.
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Figure 4.2: SUS scores by participant, before and after the video
4.3

Acceptance

We used the Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) to help us gauge participants’ acceptance
of FIDO2 with hardware tokens. The TAM uses a series of questions asked on a 7-point
Likert scale of agreement with statements regarding Perceived Usefulness (PU) and Perceived
Ease of Use (PE), with half of the questions for each attribute.
With the TAM and extensions we used, there were 6 questions each for PU and PE
(questions are included in the appendix). We quantified the responses from -3 (Strongly
disagree, not useful or not easy to use) to 3 (Strongly agree, useful or easy to use) for our
calculations. The average results across all participants are shown in Table 4.1.
Both PU and PE started out on the useful/easy side of neutral, both increasing slightly
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Question
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q5
Q6
Avg

Pre-video PU
1.1
0.45
0.6
0.5
0.95
1.4
0.83

Post-video PU
1.35
0.8
1.0
0.65
1.1
1.55
1.08

Pre-video PE
2.5
1.85
1.9
0.6
2.15
2.25
1.88

Post-video PE
2.25
1.65
2.0
1.4
2.25
2.15
1.95

Table 4.1: TAM question scores averaged across all participants.
after the video: the average PU started at 0.83 and increased to 1.08 after the video, and the
PE started at 1.88 and increased to 1.95 after the video. These numbers translate to the PU
averaging around “Somewhat agree” and the PE averaging close to “Agree.”
To see if the video shown to the participants caused a statistically significant increase
on the PU and PE scores, we ran a one-tailed t-test on the changes of the average PU
and PE score of each participant. For PU, a p-value of 0.006 was calculated, which is
statistically significant given an α of 0.05. For PE, a p-value of 0.29 was calculated, which is
not statistically significant.
We also asked participants their likelihood to adopt FIDO2 with hardware tokens if it
were widely offered, again with a 7-point Likert scale. The results of this are shown in Figure
4.3.

Figure 4.3: Likelihood of adopting FIDO2 if it were offered widely.
There is a clear shift in likelihood of adopting FIDO2 after the video. We quantified
these scores into -3 (Extremely unlikely) to 3 (Extremely likely) as well, and found an average
of 0.85 before the video, and 1.55 after the video.
To determine if this increase was significant, we ran a one-tailed t-test on the differences
13

in the scores for each individual, and calculated a p-value of 0.006, which is statistically
significant given an α of 0.05.
Changes in likelihood to use didn’t appear to share any patterns with changes in either
TAM score per participant.

4.4

Qualitative Results

We asked participants about their general experience with FIDO2 on a mobile device,
advantages and disadvantages they saw, and the websites they would use it on and why.

4.4.1

General Experience

When asked how their general experience with FIDO2 went, participants generally responded
with answers that fall into 4 categories: general positive sentiments, general negative sentiments, benefits over passwords, and specific concerns.
Almost all participants expressed general positive feelings both before and after the
video. These responses included things such as how FIDO2 is “simple”, how it “feels cool
and secure,” and how it is easy to get faster at it over time.
8 of the 20 participants expressed some general negative things about their experience
before the video. These responses included feelings of unfamiliarity, the need for help, and
feelings that FIDO2 was not particularly secure.
After the video, 4 of those 8 participants no longer reported those general negative
statements.
About a quarter of participants expressed how their experience with FIDO2 were
better than passwords, such as how FIDO2 was faster than passwords and they didn’t need
to manage passwords or type them.
3 participants expressed specific concerns before the video, such as concerns with
device loss, theft, or damage, or device compatibility. After the video, 2 of those 3 no longer
reported those specific concerns.
14

4.4.2

Advantages

When asked about advantages FIDO2 with hardware tokens has over passwords, participants
gave responses that fall into 3 categories: convenience, security, and utility.
Convenience includes such things as being better than passwords in efficiency and
mental effort, not having to change passwords, and not having to switch to a password
manager. Most participants gave responses that fell into this category before the video. After
the video, 4 of these participants no longer reported anything in the Convenience category.
However, 2 participants who didn’t mention convenience before the video did mention it after
the video.
About half of the 20 participants gave responses related to security. After the video, 2
of those no longer reported security as an advantage. However, there were 3 participants who
reported security after the video but didn’t before the video.
Utility covers responses that mention the ability to have a backup token or the ability
to share accounts to others. There were no responses in this category before the video, but 3
participants who gave utility-related responses after the video.

4.4.3

Disadvantages

When asked for perceived disadvantages with using FIDO2, responses fell into 4 categories:
cost of the token, inconvenience, account loss, and potential implementation issues.
Both before and after the video, 2 participants reported cost as a disadvantage, but
the 2 before the video were different than the 2 after.
Inconvenience covers responses involving things such as the need to carry the token,
potential compatibility issues, or how FIDO2 may be more cumbersome than other authentication methods. A little less than half of participants gave responses related to inconvenience
before the video. 3 of those participants didn’t report inconvenience after the video.
Most participants gave responses involving account loss, such as the potential for a
token to be damaged, lost, or stolen; the need for a backup; and recovery. After the video, 4 of
15

those participants no longer reported account loss-related disadvantages. But 2 participants
took their place in reporting account loss disadvantages.
Before the video, 3 participants reported implementation-related disadvantages, such
as concerns with sharing accounts (being able to, or potentially someone to whom an account
was shared taking over the account), difficulty in adding FIDO2 to existing systems, and
potential bugs. All 3 of those participants no longer reported disadvantages in this category
after the video. 3 other participants took their place in reporting these things after the video.

4.4.4

Websites

When participants indicated a positive likelihood of adoption, they were asked what websites
they would use FIDO2 on. Responses were basically: important/sensitive sites, non-important
sites, and general use (both important and non-important).
Before the video, 8 participants stated they would only use FIDO2 on important sites,
and 2 reported they would only use it on non-important sites, with 5 reporting general use.
Participants generally broadend what websites they would use FIDO2 on after the video.
When asked why participants would use FIDO2 on those particular sites, about half
reported reasons related to convenience, and slightly fewer than half reported security-related
reasons.
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Chapter 5
Discussion

At the start of this study, we sought out to answer 5 questions:
 How do users perceive FIDO2 passwordless authentication on mobile devices in terms

of usability?
 Are users accepting of FIDO2 passwordless authentication in the mobile context?
 Are users willing to use FIDO2 passwordless authentication instead of passwords when

logging in on mobile devices?
 How do users compare FIDO2 passwordless authentication to their prior use of pass-

words? What advantages and disadvantages do they see compared to passwords?
 How do users’ perceptions of passwordless FIDO2 change after learning more about how

it works? This includes SUS scores, acceptance scores, and advantages/disadvantages
relative to passwords.

5.1

Perception of Usability

With a SUS score of 80, it seems that the participants in this study found FIDO2 very usable.
The PE of almost 2 on our scale agrees. After the initial hurdle some participants experienced,
they seemed to be perfectly competent using it for the duration of the study.
Usability didn’t seem to be very affected by learning about FIDO2 through the video,
possibly indicating that most of the perception of usability came from actually using the
system during the simulation portion of the study. In the participants who changed their
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answers after the video, the SUS scores and average PE don’t seem to follow much of a
pattern of change.

5.2

Acceptance

Before the video, the TAM scores (both PU and PE) and the average likelihood of adoption
of FIDO2 were positive, which indicates that participants likely perceived FIDO2 as easier
than not and more useful than not, and they were more willing than neutral to adopt FIDO2.
As stated before, the PE didn’t seem to follow much of a pattern in terms of change
after the video and change in answers, and the PU and likelihood of adoption didn’t appear
to follow any pattern relating to participants’ changes in answers either.
However, the likelihood of adoption increased, as did the PU, potentially indicating
that users may be more willing to adopt FIDO2 by learning about how useful it is, not just
how usable it is.

5.3

Comparison to Passwords

The major advantage over passwords as reported by the participants of this study was
convenience. FIDO2 was created as a convenient solution to replace passwords. With FIDO2,
users don’t need to deal with creating or memorizing complex passwords for each website, or
even typing them for that matter.
Security likely contributes, but probably not quite as much in general. Fewer participants mentioned it as an advantage over passwords, and as stated in [9], end users will do
the bare minimum to go around security measures, such as strengthening passwords.
While convenience-related responses were reported by almost all participants, inconveniencerelated responses were reported as disadvantages by almost half of the participants. Rather
than being contradictory to conveniences, most inconvenience-related responses were things
like needing to carry the token, have it handy, and make sure your device is compatible with
it. So it’s more of a convenience trade-off: mental effort of memorizing passwords for physical
18

effort of carrying the hardware token.
But the primary disadvantage response category was account loss. This has been
found to be common by other studies of FIDO2 or other work with hardware tokens. As
great as the advantages of FIDO2 are, if users are scared they might lose their accounts, they
may not actually be willing to adopt FIDO2, regardless of their response on paper.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion

This study showed that FIDO2 may be a usable password replacement at some point,
even on mobile devices. The study did show that acceptance and willingness to adopt FIDO2
may not just be based on how usable it is, but also on how useful it is perceived to be.
However, this usefulness may not be readily apparent just from using FIDO2, and may require
some additional instruction to instill it into the minds of users. No matter what, as long as
users have large concerns about using FIDO2, primarily the potential loss of account access,
they may be hesitant to adopt it, though future work may shed additional light on this.
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Appendix A
User Instructions
This is the set of instructions given on a sheet of paper to each participant.
1. Simulate Day 1:
(a) Begin your “job” by registering an account at https://quidentia.com
(b) Clock into your “job”
(c) Enter information for the first client into the site
i. Client information is located on a separate sheet provided
(d) Clock out and go on “break”
(e) On “break,” create an account at https://streamporium.com
(f) On the Streamporium site, watch 2 movie trailers
(g) Clock back into work on the Quidentia site
(h) Enter information for another client
(i) Clock out and inform the coordinator that you have finished the first day of the
simulation
2. Simulate Day 2:
(a) Before work on Day 2, create an account at https://zaptransaction.com, the site
you use to send money to friends.
(b) On the Zap Transaction site, send $50 to the (fictitious) account of your friend
Martin Brant (@brant.mar.55)
(c) Go back to the Quidentia site and clock into work.
(d) Enter information for another client.
(e) Clock out for a short work day.
(f) Go to the Zap Transaction site and check your balance.
(g) Go to the Streamporium site and watch another trailer.
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(h) Go back to the Zap Transaction site and send $75 to the (fictitious) account of
your friend Flavia Alvey (@flalvey.33).
(i) Inform the coordinator that you have finished Day 2 of the simulation.
3. Simulate Day 3:
(a) Begin Day 3 by going to the Zap Transaction site and making a donation of an
amount of your choice to a (fictitious) charity of your choice.
(b) Go to the Quidentia site and clock in.
(c) Enter another client‘s information and clock out for “break.”
(d) Watch another trailer on the Streamporium site.
(e) Check your balance on the Zap Transaction site.
(f) Return to the Quidentia site and clock back in.
(g) Enter another client‘s information and clock out
(h) Let the coordinator know that you have finished Day 3.
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Appendix B
SUS Questions
The System Usability Scale (SUS) questions are a standard set of 10 questions used
to calculate the SUS score of a system. Questions are statements to which respondents mark
their agreement on a 5-point Likert scale from “Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree.” Odd
questions contribute a high positive amount to the score for agreement, and even questions
contribute a high positive amount to the score for disagreement.
1. I think that I would like to use this system frequently.
2. I found the system unnecessarily complex.
3. I thought the system was easy to use.
4. I think that I would need the support of a technical person to be able to use this system.
5. I found the various functions in this system were well integrated.
6. I thought there was too much inconsistency in this system.
7. I would imagine that most people would learn to use this system very quickly.
8. I found the system very cumbersome to use.
9. I felt very confident using the system.
10. I needed to learn a lot of things before I could get going with this system.
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Appendix C
TAM Questions
The Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) uses 2 sets of statements to examine users’
perceptions of the usefulness and the ease of use of a system. In this study, respondents were
asked to state their agreement with these statements on a 7-point Likert scale from “Strongly
disagree” to “Strongly agree.”
The Perceived Usefulness (PU) items were as follows:
1. Using this system in my job would enable me to accomplish tasks more quickly.
2. Using this system would improve my job performance.
3. Using this system in my job would increase my productivity.
4. Using this system would enhance my effectiveness on the job.
5. Using this system would make it easier to do my job.
6. I would find this system useful in my job.
The Perceived Ease of Use (PE) items were as follows:
1. Learning to operate this system would be easy for me.
2. I would find it easy to get this system to do what I want it to do.
3. My interaction with this system would be clear and understandable.
4. I would find this system to be flexible to interact with.
5. It would be easy for me to become skillful at using this system.
6. I would find this system easy to use.
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Appendix D
Video script
Alice decides she wants to try a new system for logging into her accounts without a
password. She hears about a new system called passwordless FIDO 2, which uses a secure
hardware token. The token looks like a USB drive, but instead of storing files it keeps track
of secret keys that she can use to login to websites securely.
Alice buys a token so she can try it with her favorite websites. She needs to register the
token with each website individually. She first visits her bank website. The token generates a
key specifically for use with her bank.
Alice plugs the token into her computer and then touches the token each time she is
asked to log into the website. This means she consents to the website using her key to verify
that it is her. She then goes to other websites and the token generates a new, different key
for each website.
What if someone tries to break into Alice‘s accounts?
Meanwhile, some unknown hacker has been trying to break into Alice’s bank account.
However, because she uses FIDO 2, and the attacker does not have her hardware
token, the attacker is unable to get into Alice’s bank account.
This means that Alice has stronger account protections for all of her accounts as
compared to using a password. An attacker might be able to guess a password she creates,
but there is no way for the attacker to get the secret key that is stored on her hardware
token.
What if Alice clicks on a phishing email?
Phishing attacks are also common. An attacker may send a link to Alice that is for
a fake bank, instead of her real bank. However, if Alice tries to log in using her hardware
token, the token will instead generate a new key, since the fake bank has a different address
than the real website. The attacker won‘t get access to her real bank account.
What if Alice loses a token?
If Alice were to lose her hardware token, she would lose access to her accounts.
However, Alice could register a backup token, and keep it in a safe place. She could use
either token to login to her accounts.
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If an attacker finds Alice’s lost token, they could try to login to Alice’s accounts. But
they would need to know the username Alice uses, and know the websites she uses them on.
A smart attacker might be able to get into her accounts. To be safe, if Alice ever lost a token
she should deactivate it with each website.
What if Alice wants to share her account with a friend?
Alice decides to share her Netflix account with a friend. Her friend buys his own
hardware token. Alice visits Netflix, logs in, and then emails her friend an access code. Her
friend enters the access code on the Netflix website, plugs in his hardware token, and gains
access to Alice‘s Netflix account. Now he can login whenever he wants using the token.
Alice can also deactivate his token any time she wants. Sharing an account works just like
registering a backup token.
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Appendix E
Changes in Participant Responses
Table E.1 shows differences in how each participant responded after the video vs. their
responses before the video, and the rows are sorted by descending likelihood of adoption.
ChSUS is the change in SUS score. ChPU is the change in the participant’s average
PU score (from -3 to 3). ChPE is the change in the participant’s average PE score. ChAcc is
the change in the participant’s acceptance (likelihood of adoption, from -3 to 3).
The remaining fields are whether or not a participant’s responses gained (G) or lost
(L) a particular response category. CP is “compare to passwords” in describing the general
experience. GP is “general positive” sentiment in describing the general experience. GN is
“general negative” sentiment in describing the general experience. SC is “specific concerns”
in describing the general experience. Con is “convenience” as an advantage. S is “security”
as an advantage. U is “utility” as an advantage. Cos is “cost” as a disadvantage. Inc is
“inconvenience” as a disadvantage. AL is “account loss” as a disadvantage. Imp is potential
“implementation” issues as a disadvantage.
ChSUS ChPU ChPE ChAcc LCP
22.50
0.33
1.50
3
-5.00
0.50
0.00
2
-12.50
0.67
-1.00
2
7.50
-0.17
-0.33
2
-12.50
1.33
0.00
2
5.00
0.00
0.17
1
-25.00
-0.17
-0.83
1
7.50
0.00
0.50
1
15.00
0.67
0.33
1
-2.50
0.17
0.00
1
-7.50
0.17
-0.50
1
10.00
0.50
0.00
0
-15.00
-0.17
0.50
0
-2.50
0.17
1.17
0
0.00
-0.17
0.00
0
2.50
0.67
0.00
0
•
0.00
0.33
-0.67
0
5.00
0.17
0.50
-1
12.50
0.00
0.17
-1
-20.00
-0.17
0.00
-1

GCP LGP GGP LGN GGN
•

LSC GSC LCon GCon LS GS LU
•
•
•
•

GU LCos GCos LInc

•

•
•

GInc LAL GAL
•

•
•

•

•

LImp GImp
•
•
•

•
•

•

•

•

•

•
•
•
•
•

•

•

•

•

•
•

•

•
•

•

•

•
•

Table E.1: Changes across all participants.
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